phrase that Potter used to diagnose the evils exemplified by the war included what would become perhaps the single most used-and overused-term of the era's political rhetoric. The war, Potter explained, was neither a political disaster nor a mistaken policy alone; it was not a misguided elaboration of containment doctrine, nor even primarily an unconstitutional abuse of executive power.The Vietnam War was rather only the most evident symptom of a far more extensive yet obscure "system"-one that, as it imposed war on the Vietnamese, also disenfranchised southern black voters, impoverished millions of Americans and, finally, created "faceless and terrible bureaucracies" where people were compelled to "spend their lives and do their work." "We must name that system," Potter declared in his renowned peroration.
We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it. For it is only when that system is changed and brought under control that there can be any hope for stopping the forces that create a war in Vietnam today or a murder in the South tomorrow or all the incalculable, innumerable more subtle atrocities that are worked on people all over-all the time. 2 So familiar a part of the language of the sixties did "the system" become that it is difficult today even to hear the term without imagining it in quotation marks. But it is worth recalling now what made the phrase such a perfect term of art in 1965. For, at a stroke, Potter's speech managed to accomplish what SDS and like-minded thinkers had been seeking to do for years-it earned the assent of thousands and ultimately millions of listeners to a fundamental recasting of the political landscape. Since the organization's founding in 1962, SDS had been proselytizing for the critique that it found adumbrated in the writings of C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, and others-that the "political apparatus" of representative democracy had hardened into a calcified piece of bureaucratic machinery."The vital democratic connection between community and leadership" had been lost, SDS's famed "Port Huron Statement" announced.The "structural separation of people from power, from relevant knowledge, from pinnacles of decision-making" had created a terrible national condition-a "felt powerlessness of ordinary people," a "resignation before the enormity of events." 3 But it was not until the Vietnam War created a broad awareness of genuine enormity that that vision became widely plausible. Dismissing seemingly minor arguments over cold war strategies and tactics, Potter pointed toward a profound pathology at the heart of liberal democracy itself-the war had "its roots deep in the institutions of American society"-and thus articulated the rapidly spreading sense that when it came to the most fundamental political crises, the most terrible examples of suffering and injustice, the ordinary political mechanics of voting, party competition, and public debate had devolved toward mere charade. 4 In this context, the vagueness of Potter's rhetoric was probably equal in importance to the urgency of his moral appeal. For while there may have been some among his listeners who thought his terminology merely evasive-who shouted "capitalism!" in response to his rhetorical questions-Potter himself claimed that it was important to be vague. "Capitalism was for me and my generation an inadequate description of the evils of America," he later said, "a hollow, dead word tied to the thirties." 5 The system, by contrast, seemed both disturbingly alive and resistant to ready definition."I wanted ambiguity," Potter recalled."I sensed there was something new afoot in the world . . . that made the rejection of the old terminology part of the new hope for radical change in America." 6 And that sense was surely shared by the vast majority of those for whom his new terminology spoke with intuitive force. Opposing the system in this light meant that politics would be seen not as a contest over policies or between parties, but as a grander struggle between the demand for self-determination and nebulously defined forces of control.The fundamental political question, Potter argued, had little to do with Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, or left and right, and still less to do with capital and labor-it had rather to do with "what place" existed "for ordinary men in that system" and how they were "to control it, make it bend itself to their wills rather than bending them to its." 7 In making that case, Potter echoed the language of the "Port Huron Statement," and he shared the suggestion made in that document that widespread political participation was itself both a good equal in importance to any political outcome and a goal that, once realized, could itself resolve the nation's most intractable political differences. Potter accordingly kept his sense of the system almost limitlessly capacious in scope. If his speech epitomized the New Left's determination to search out the structural forces that appeared to link together even the most disparate issues, it also exemplified the temptation to assimilate vastly different problems into one hazy rubric.As he described things, racial terror in the American South, colonial war in Indochina, and the more "subtle atrocities" of the white-collar workplace all came down to the same fundamental problem:"The system that frustrate [d] ," the Vietnamese Liberation Front and the system that frustrated young, highly trained workers, at bottom were "the same."
In describing matters in this way, Potter and his allies fundamentally redefined the political terrain and recast the characteristics of political action itself, so that not only in its goals and complaints, but in its methods and strategies, the new politics of the sixties reflected the powerful concerns of the young, university-trained activists who invented it. Two years before his speech in Washington, Potter had excited his colleagues in SDS with a vision of "the intellectual as an agent of social change." 8 In his famous denunciation of the system, Potter began to make good on that promise."We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it," Potter claimed-a turn of phrase that implied rather strongly that the origin of political action, and perhaps the epitome of it as well, lay with the intellectual's gifts of analysis and interpretation.
To be sure, these ideas were neither wholly distinctive nor wholly new. The very idea of the system drew on some of the technocratic discourses that had been an increasing part of academic life since World War II. 9 Complaints against the banality and the merely formal democracy of American politics had been central features of the jeremiads of Mills and other social critics-as, less prominently, had been both the notion that "the young intelligentsia" might be the privileged agents of contemporary history and the thought that its members had a natural affinity with the emerging politics of anti-colonial struggle. 10 The conviction that the major antagonisms created by a capitalist economy were in some basic sense no longer definitive was likewise a prominent feature of the intellectual life of postwar prosperity. 11 So, too, was Potter's indifference to the institutions of representative democracy: the belief that the competition of mainstream party politics amounted mainly to froth on the deeper waves of cultural and interest group alignment was a central premise of the pluralist theory that dominated postwar American political thought and of much of the cultural theory that developed alongside it. 12 In the early sixties, Americans also widely shared the heady sense that these and other factors-including, most basically, the encompassing context of the cold war-combined to produce a new, more expansive experience of politics.When Hannah Arendt claimed in 1963 that it was "the style of everything" JFK did that made the Kennedy administration "so strikingly different-different not its formulation or pursuit of American policies, but rather in its estimate of politics as such," she spoke for many of her contemporaries excited by what seemed the new possibilities for heroic leadership. 13 But the Vietnam War and the entire atmosphere of crisis surrounding it created an environment in which these ideas were fused and catalyzed, to take on entirely new, deeper, and unpredictable dimensions. And it was people like Potter and his allies who crafted the languages that would both make sense of that transformation and chart the directions along which the tumultuous events of the subsequent years would develop. Much as he predicted, the sixties changed and vastly expanded the definition of what was meant by politics-of what counted as a political issue, of where the serious sources of political conflict lay, and of what amounted to genuine political action.
Where previously "politics" typically had described a delimited network of institutions, it would now describe the process of looking beyond such boundaries, toward a final and more decisive divide: be-tween this system, and whatever lay beyond it. Attempting in '69 to picture a world after "revolution," Potter claimed that the deepest intuition he could summon about it was that in a future that had surpassed "the technology machine," the "thing we call language would no longer occur; it would be too utterly inadequate to express relationships among people. If people made sounds our ears could discern, we would hear them as strange music that . . . would have no connection . . . to what we call speech" (206-07). The presence of strange music identifies the outside of Potter's system; but within it, "culture" more generally provides a glimpse of his post-linguistic dispensation. He and others often referred to culture as the system's antithesis; true culture named all that the system had displaced.When he lamented the effects of the system, Potter described it as a kind of "cultural genocide"; the system performed a "cultural lobotomy" on its subjects (133). 14 Culture preserved those aspects of local community that nurtured the individual and aided in self-actualization; the system, by contrast, reified social relations and rendered them instrumental. In this account, culture nostalgically described the set of organic, pre-industrial relations that the system had destroyed.Yet this same system was frightening precisely because it too was seen to possess a remarkable organic coherence: it was a seamlessly interrelated amalgam of not less than everything. And as the contributors to "Countercultural Capital" all differently note, this same species of assimilating vastness would come to characterize the era's most utopian visions of culture. In these visions, nothing would counter culture, for there was nothing but culture, save for the system that shadowed it. Culture was, in fact, the system-only transcribed into terms that a counterculture might more readily "name . . . describe . . . analyze" and "control."
It is in this context that a category like "the literary" retains such a surprisingly powerful purchase on the era. Indeed, Potter's characteristically literary language-like his prophetic invocation of strange music-might serve as a representative instance of the era's widely shared investment in culture. As our contributors demonstrate, much of the important literature of the period embraced a recognizably New Left style of politics. But the new political attitudes so prevalent throughout American society in the sixties likewise reserved a special place for recognizably literary values: the ineffable, the extraordinary, and the mysterious. Thus the familiar conflict between liberals and conservatives, like the one between capital and labor, gave way to what seemed more fundamental battles-among them, most basically, one between the imaginative and the unimaginative. Sartre saw the various events of '68 as part of a worldwide "liberation of the imagination," and his perspective was widely shared by New Leftists, who frequently suggested that both the aims and the substance of their politics hinged on "the human potential for freedom and creativity." 15 According to Sheldon Wolin, the very essence of politics was "the transcending form of vision" and "the imaginative reordering of political life." 16 John and Barbara Ehrenreich spoke similarly:"In spite of the lids on our own imaginations, we must still be able to imagine how men's imaginations can be freed." 17 In these often intensely romantic exhortations, the political imagination assumed something like the quality that literature had been accorded by the critics of literary modernism-the capacity that exceeded and transformed the merely quotidian. Even as New Leftists rejected the elitist trappings of high modernist culture, they preserved perhaps its most essential core: the commitment to a secular but nevertheless transcendent truth beyond science and routine.Thus for Potter, a redemptive political movement required searching out "such a culture" as would issue from "unknown, distant lands" (207).
Taking up in various arenas the politicization of culture and the vast diffusion and redefinition of politics that accompanied it, the essays in this collection seek to identify the costs as well as the benefits of the enduring suggestion made by Potter and like-minded thinkers that radical politics needed to become cultural politics. In our first essay, "Past Using: James Baldwin and Civil Rights Law in the 1960s," Deak Nabers examines heated debates over how to understand the relations between legislative politics and American culture. Nabers explains how and by what logic thinkers like Baldwin and Lyndon Johnson came to change their belief that legal and political reform might best eradicate the pervasive effects of racial discrimination. Both came to believe, he argues, that the only way to eradicate noxious social practices was to understand their origin. Nabers thus focuses on the role of "history" in Baldwin's essays on civil rights, and shows that Baldwin's growing attention over the course of the sixties to the deeprooted power of custom and culture mirrored Johnson's own increasing skepticism about the necessity and viability of the legal and political reform of American racism. In LBJ's conventional liberalism, this skepticism sprang from the paradoxical belief that, as an historical legacy, racism was in the process of disappearing and was therefore, as a present fact, impervious to anything other than cultural sea-changes that he believed his administration could never affect. In Baldwin's more prophetic sensibility, the legacy of American racism became a terrible, mysterious, and, ultimately fatal, power, assailable only by an augmented understanding of the autonomy of culture from law and politics. As Nabers shows, versions of that fatalistic thinking, and of a concomitant resistance to future-oriented reform, remain hallmarks of the discourse surrounding civil rights in the United States.
For Nabers, Baldwin's turn to a historically-minded cultural politics coincided with a rejection of the efficacy of legal and political insti-tutions, present even within some of these institutions themselves. In "Learning from Little Tree: The Political Education of the Counterculture," Mark McGurl shows how the turn in emphasis during the sixties "from 'activism' to 'culture'" ended up changing the terms of political engagement within the institutions of higher education.The turn to culture, he argues, "coincided with a relative shift in interest from the politics of access to educational institutions to a politics of identity conducted within these institutions." McGurl begins by considering the recent revelations that "Forrest Carter," the pseudonymous author of the beloved sentimental novel of Native American life, The Education of Little Tree, only took up fiction after abandoning a long career as an ardent propagandist for segregation and white supremacy. But in McGurl's analysis, the questions of identity raised in the controversy surrounding Little Tree are important mainly for the way they represent larger historical changes that took place during the sixties; as he points out, theories of pedagogy play a central and ambivalent role in the countercultural imagination, as they do in the tradition of American liberalism more generally. School appears as both the central institution of repressive socialization and, more positively, as a promising means to fashion a more diverse and yet harmonious society. McGurl reveals the manner in which Little Tree deftly draws on the conventions that enable Native Americans to represent both sides of this ambivalence, and he shows the way that Carter's novel dramatizes the development since the sixties of a thoroughly institutionalized and anodyne cultural pluralism.
McGurl details the set of assumptions that allowed many academics during the sixties to locate their politics in the kind of content they taught in the classroom. Generations of teachers turned to Little Tree, he points out, largely because its appreciative rendering of Native American life enabled them to overlook the forms of socialization important to their own institutions.Amy Hungerford, on the other hand, tackles the tendency in countercultural literary thinking to transcend content altogether: specifically, to downplay the significance of meaning and focus instead on the liberating somatic experiences made available by a wholly material language. In "Postmodern Supernaturalism: Ginsberg and the Search for a Supernatural Language," Hungerford considers the development of Allen Ginsberg's poetic theories in the 1960s and explores their striking similarity to emergent post-structural language theory and simultaneous developments within popular Christianity. As Hungerford explains, Ginsberg developed a new materialist and performative theory of language in the sixties-similar in a number of ways to the deconstructive accounts of signification developed by Paul de Man and others around the same time-partly as the result of a personal crisis that had undermined his earlier vision of the poet as seer and visionary.Abandoning this earlier mysticism, Ginsberg turned to a Buddhist-inspired emphasis on the bodily effects of chanting words, even as the "charismatic" and NeoPentecostal movements similarly embraced forms of content-less language.As Hungerford shows, Ginsberg's performative emphasis on the sheer sonic quality of a poetry stripped of propositional content reintroduced a newly fortified mystical sensibility. In its promised ability to transform people without communicating to them, Ginsberg's chanted poetry became again supernaturally efficacious. As Hungerford points out, Ginsberg's efforts to "make Mantra of American language" thus echoed contemporaneous efforts to produce what was, in effect, a vision of spiritual and political association without content. Hungerford demonstrates a striking range of cases in which a stress on the non-propositional features of language accompanied an effort to imagine ways that words might unite people without demanding communication or shared convictions among them.
Hungerford argues that a politics so conceived is more than simply empty; attending to the poetic and evangelical commitment to an exclusively somatic process of conversion, she shows the necessarily coercive component to the drive to change bodies rather than minds. Rolland Murray likewise takes up the coercive underside of the performative language theory that developed during the sixties. In "How the Conjure-Man Gets Busy: Cultural Nationalism, Masculinity, and Performativity," Murray examines the claim, important to the Black Power movement, that the incantatory linguistic performances of charismatic black men might successfully convert black women not just to the cause of cultural nationalism, but to the appropriate relation to culture upon which that cause was seen to depend. Murray reads John Oliver Killens's satirical novel The Cotillion in particular as an ambivalent response to this set of claims.As Murray sees it, Killens's novel highlights a little-noticed similarity between the social pretensions of the black middle class and the macho politics of cultural nationalism: both insisted on stagy displays of status and power. In The Cotillion, young women of the black bourgeoisie are coerced into mimicking the codes of white high society; but as Murray points out, women recruited by cultural nationalists are similarly figured as passive receptacles for male charisma and authority. Thus Killens reveals in The Cotillion the paternalism evident elsewhere in his own nationalist writing, but he also raises a still more damaging prospect for the nationalist project. Murray argues that, placing great weight on the fundamental importance of authenticity, cultural nationalism inevitably gave rise to both the opportunity for and the obsession with fakery. A writer like Killens became obsessed with cultural fraudulence in part because his own political premises made style the most important of all issues.
In "Shipwreck and Autonomy: Rawls, Riesman, and Oppen in the 1960s," Mary Esteve takes up another facet of the pervasive countercultural investment in authenticity. Where Murray focuses on black intellectuals eager to distance themselves from the subsuming universalism of the Civil Rights movement, Esteve focuses on white intellectuals who came of age before the sixties and shared a distinct ambivalence toward the movement's later refusal of universalism, particularly its existentialist tendency to derive authenticity from the atomizing experience of alienation. As Esteve points out, the political philosopher John Rawls, the sociologist David Riesman, and the poet George Oppen all believed in the socially-regulative necessity of reason. Politically, all were social democrats. Intellectually, all remained attached to the premises of a Kantian liberalism, and wary of the critique of Enlightenment that dominated the social movements of the sixties. Esteve argues that Riesman and Oppen were particularly adept at refuting the criticism, directed today at Rawls and his heirs, that invoking the independently reasoning subject demanded turning a blind eye to the empirical realities of a repressive political order. Both Riesman and Oppen, she claims, depend upon the conceit at the heart of Rawls's philosophy: the subject who contemplates the requirements of social justice without regard to her own position in the ideal society she would thus create. But Riesman and Oppen both, Esteve shows, invoke contemplative autonomy primarily on the heel of calamity and catastrophe, the individual experience of which provides further opportunity to reassert the primacy of reason.Theirs was an engaged poetics, she insists, critical of the political order even as it depended on a universalizing version of the Kantian sublime. Esteve thus offers an unfamiliar portrait of Oppen, showing him to be deeply responsive to the existential appeal to authenticity while nonetheless hostile to the anti-Enlightenment elaboration of this appeal, to which critics continue to lend his name. Where Esteve identifies a Kantian strain of thought crucial to criticisms of the countercultural embrace of experience and alienation, James Steintrager identifies an altogether different figure from the 18th century, one crucial to countercultural thinking on sexual liberation: the Marquis de Sade. Like Esteve, Steintrager faults the counterculture for renouncing the discourse of autonomy, not as it pertains to individual reason, but as it pertains to social practices and institutions. In "Liberating Sade," Steintrager turns to Sade's resuscitation during the sixties, and points out how frequently both middlebrow writing on sexual liberation and more ambitious philosophical and avant-garde treatments of sexuality turned to him for inspiration in their efforts to work out the relation between sexual and political liberation. Steintrager's essay takes us through the era's various incomplete and distorted depictions of Sade, noting that a fundamental confusion haunts the era's imagination of Sadism. On the one hand, writers and cultural producers in the sixties called on Sade for a "cautionary and essentialist" depiction of the darker sides of human nature. In this version, Sade's writings promised a homeopathic cure for the universal human tendency toward power and cruelty. On the other hand, a "progressive," quasi-Rousseauian vision turned to Sade for an example of an innocent sensibility cruelly imprisoned by perverse social convention. In Steintrager's analysis, that widely shared ambiguity points toward a still deeper confusion: a tendency, to which Sade was often recruited, to see sexual liberation as but one face of human liberation tout court. Steintrager argues that the tendency to see sexual liberation as the key to all conceivable liberation actively impeded efforts to understand the larger relationships that bound together interrelated but nonetheless importantly autonomous spheres of sociability.
Maria Farland takes up the closely related tendency within the sexual liberation movement to eschew the analysis of specific institutions and practices in favor of an absolutist and undifferentiated vision of social totality. Noting the importance of sexual liberation to the development of the era's new cultural feminism, her essay "'Total system, total solution, total apocalypse': Sex Oppression, Systems of Property, and 1970s Women's Liberation Fiction" argues that the sexual revolution and radical feminism shared an effort to find the roots of human injustice less in reformable institutions or economic relations than in the most deeply rooted structures of sexual life. Paying particular attention to prominent rejections of Marxist thinking within radical feminism, Farland's essay culminates in a reading of Erica Jong's Fear of Flying. Farland argues that this novel reflects the curious manner in which some feminist thinkers, committed to what they thought of as political extremism, ended up embracing an apocalyptic sensibility that issued in strongly antipolitical, individualist, and spiritual visions of personal freedom, visions of transcendence that turned on leaving behind not just gravity, but all the constraints of human interdependence.
Rachel Adams takes up more immediately tangible pursuits of personal freedom in "'Going to Canada': The Politics and Poetics of Northern Exodus," an essay which considers representations of one of the most incendiary figures of the era's popular imagination: the draft dodger. Like Steintrager and Farland,Adams examines the assumptions and literary devices that underwrote the period's conflations of sex and politics. Examining a variety of fictional treatments,Adams points out that the draft dodger has often worked in imaginative literature as a means to consider the gendered relations among state, nation, and citizenry. In forgotten fictional writing from the sixties and seventies, Adams points out, draft dodgers themselves often defend an intensely individualist hostility to state power as well as to national distinction, a libertarian attitude that was frequently represented through contrapuntal images of sexual anxiety and freedom. Since that time, Adams notes, writers have used the figure of the draft dodger to more allegorical ends; where Vietnam-era authors tended to pit the dodger's polymorphous sexuality against an oppressively normative "system," recent authors draw on the theoretical premises of their generic forbears to different effect, using the figure of heterosexual marriage to conflate personal and national allegiance. In some cases,Adams points out, post-Vietnam revisionist writing uses stories of regret and longing to reassert an indissoluble link among state, nation, and citizenry. In other cases, she shows how women use stories of draft dodging to challenge the libertarian premises of their predecessors, creating a counter-narrative that highlights the limits of a devotion to individual freedom alone as a vehicle for progressive politics or civic association.
Taken together, the essays in this collection advance neither a particular nor comprehensive account of the sixties. We have not intended to characterize this decade in toto or to advance anything like a unified criticism of it. But these essays do share a commitment to identifying prominent strains of radical thought from the sixties that continue to have meaningful purchase within the academic humanities and significant implications for the polity of which that academy is but one part. Our aim is to reinvigorate debate on problems that remain vitally important; if the contributors to this volume share anything at all, it's the sense that the problems of effective dissent-to say nothing of political organization generally-must remain recognizable as problems worthy of the most serious and sustained criticism.
